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 Highlights : 
 
 In 2017, the French Government tried to reform dental contracts.  
 Dentists & Dental Students went on the biggest strike in 20 years. 
 Price ceilings and lack of financing preventive care were the chief complaints. 
 France is still lacking robust epidemiological data for its dental policy making. 
 
Abstract 
France possesses a mixed public-private oral health system with no out of pocket payments for most 
routine dental treatments. The "Convention" regulates tariffs between the elected dental trade unions, 
the National Health Insurance and Complimentary Health Insurers. It is periodically revised and negotiated 
by the three parties in order to introduce new procedures, improve the access to dental care of the 
population and to adjust procedure costs for inflation. At the beginning of the last negotiations in 
September 2016 health minister Marisol Touraine introduced a new legal procedure, the Arbitrary 
Judgment, which came into force if the Dentists failed to agree to the NHI's propositions. These 
propositions included setting caps on most of the previously unregulated dental prosthetics and a global 
price ceiling on the whole dental market. This sparked a nationwide strike of the profession, a blockade 
of all 16 Dental Schools and several national protests. This movement raised nationwide debates 
regarding the access to dental treatments, preventive care and out of pocket payments for patients. The 
political tensions generated between the stakeholders, as well as the lack of both robust epidemiological 
and economic data challenges the ability of this policy making process to produce comprehensive, 
evidence based and economically sustainable reforms.  
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1.Political and economic background  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
1.1 The French Fee-For-Service convention  
In France, 99% of General Dental Practitioners work according to the “Convention”, a national contract 
negotiated by the elected dental trade unions, the National Health Insurance (NHI) and Complimentary 
(private) Health Insurers (CHI)(1). Most treatments follow a fee-for-service (FFS) scheme in which patients 
pay their dentist the full cost of the treatments and are automatically reimbursed by their insurance(s) a 
few days later. In some situations, third-party payment is also possible. The total budget spent on 
Dentistry was €11.1Billion in 2016(2), which accounts for 0.5% of the French GDP(2). Compared to EU28 
Countries, the expenditure per capita is $169.78 (€138.95), narrowly below the EU average of $196.62 
(€160.92) (3). The ANI law(4) (June 2013) rendered employer-provided insurance compulsory for private 
companies, with 1 or more employees. Employees can upgrade their benefits package (e.g. to cover 
advanced dental care) but they have to pay unsubsidized premiums. As of today, 95% of French patients 
are covered by a private insurance, and therefore benefit from a large list of treatments without any 
copayment. Based on the FFS scheme, dental procedures are classified under three categories (see Table 
1 below): 
The first group are dental procedures for which fees are fully regulated (R) by the convention ("Actes 
remboursables opposables"). They represent most of the elementary dental procedures, such as 
consultations, restorative work, extractions, root canal treatments, and scale and polish. The NHI 
reimburses patients 70% of the fee. The remaining 30% is paid by the patient or their complementary 
health insurance.  
The second group are procedures that have a reimbursement fee but aren't regulated (RNR) ("Actes à 
entente directe"). A baseline fee is defined by the NHI, but dentists can charge patients a higher price. The 
NHI reimburses 70% of the baseline fee. Depending on the patient's contract, CHI pay some or all of the 
remaining cost which could be anywhere between 30% and several times the baseline fee. As such, 
patients with good private insurances can expect to be fully reimbursed for the majority of treatments 
from this partially regulated group.  
The third group of procedures are not regulated nor reimbursed by the NHI ("Actes non pris en charge"). 
Procedures may be fully or partially reimbursed by the CHI.  
 
 
 
Table 1 : 3 types of fees in the French convention 
Type Payment Examples of procedures 
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Regulated fees 
(R) 
70% NHI, 30% CHI or out of 
pocket 
Consultation, scale and polish, 
fissure sealants, fillings, 
extractions, X-rays, root canal 
treatment 
Reimbursed, non-regulated 
(RNR) 
70% NHI; 30%-600% CHI 
(depending on contract) or out 
of pocket 
Crowns, bridges, dentures, 
orthodontic treatments (< 18 
years only) 
Non-Reimbursed Non-
regulated fees 
(NRNR) 
0% NHI; CHI fixed amount 
(depending on contract) or out 
of pocket 
Periodontal treatments, fluoride 
varnishes, implant surgery. 
 
In addition to this general scheme, patients at financial risk and undocumented foreign nationals in 
precarious situation are covered by the Complementary Universal Medical Coverage (CMUc) and the State 
Medical Aid (AME). CMUc and AME set a band of fully regulated fees and face no out of pocket payment. 
A prevention-oriented scheme also exists, the Bilan Bucco-Dentaire, which offers screening consultations 
and following restorative treatments with no co-payment for pregnant women and children (aged 6, 9, 
12, 15 and 18)(5).  
The current convention was signed in 2006, and revised by negotiations twice, leading to its third version 
(5–7). The negotiations for the 4th revision started in September 2016. 
It is important to note that oral healthcare is provided solely by dentists, without hygienists.  Chairside 
nurses are present in dental practices, but dentists work mostly singlehandedly: in 2017, 19213 total 
employees (nurses, receptionists, cleaning staff) were declared, for 42 000 dentists.(8).   
 
1.2 Recommendations by the The National Audit Office (NAA) ("Cour des Comptes") 
 
 
In September 2016, the National Audit Office, the independent supreme body for auditing the use of 
public funds in France, published a report on the dental profession.(9) 
Some of the recommendations to the Government and NHI were as follows: 
1. To define and implement a comprehensive strategy for oral health, based on periodical epidemiological 
surveys and set action plans. 
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2. To implement an accreditation system guaranteeing the quality and the security of treatments in dental 
practices, with indicators set by the HAS (French National Authority for Health, equivalent to UK's NICE). 
3. To regulate the fees of the most frequent prosthodontic procedures. 
4. To eliminate any obstacles to the development of corporate practices and chains of practices (operated 
by HMOs or by not-for-profit organizations), especially by guaranteeing a complete access to billing data. 
 
2. Health policy processes 
2.1 Stakeholders 
 
The government and the NHI 
 
The NHI, following some of the Office's recommendations, proposed a plan on the 26th of November, 
with two main goals. Firstly, to reduce to the amount of out of pocket (OOP) payment faced by patients 
(mainly on prosthodontic work). This would be achieved by a cap on some fees in the category of 
reimbursed, non-regulated (RNR) procedures. Second, to compensate the dentists’ accordingly by 
increasing the fees on a selection of regulated procedures, considered to be more conservative from a 
medical standpoint. The changes would apply for patients under the general scheme (NHI ± CHI) and those 
benefiting from the CMUc.(10,11) 
 
The dental trade unions 
The three unions representing dentists agreed beforehand on a “common proposition platform”. Their 
main objective was a review of the regulated fees to meet the rising expenses of dental practices. These 
fees were judged as “extremely low” by all of the dental trade unions. 
The dental trade unions estimated that achieving a satisfactory amount for increasing ceilings on 
regulated fees would cost an additional €2.5Billion.(10) 
 
The complimentary health insurers 
 
The union of private complimentary health insurers (UNOCAM) is represented at the negotiations in order 
to evaluate and give an agreement on their financial capacity to sustain the reforms. 
Patients 
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Although patients and consumers representatives do not participate in the discussions, several highly 
mediatized reports were published in the years preceding the negotiation, denouncing high patient out 
of pocket expenses on dental prosthetics(12). This added to the political pressure for a change. 
 
 
2.2 The negotiation process 
 
 
The process was to take an agreed number of meetings, allowing external parties, such as the dental 
students, to communicate their arguments. Matters such as professional demographics and health 
inequalities were also to be discussed. 
An element of surprise for the Dental Trade unions emerged on October 27th, 2016. An amendment to 
the annual bill for the NHI’s budget, was introduced by the government. It stipulated that if the three 
parties did not reach an agreement by February 1st, 2017, a mediator would be nominated to arrange an 
"Arbitrary Judgment" and decide the content of the new convention. This amendment led to substantial 
protests amongst dental trade unions, who declared that they were hostage to a potentially punitive 
decision by the mediator. Several propositions were subsequently made by the NHI and rejected by the 
dental trade unions, which declared that “the effort asked to the dental professionals by introducing caps 
on prosthodontic procedures was not compensated by the increase in price ceilings on regulated fees”. 
The CNSD, followed by the FSDL, the two main dental trade unions, suspended their participation in the 
negotiations on January 6th, 2017. The Arbitrary Judgment procedure then followed. After consulting with 
the stakeholders, the arbitrator proposed a new version of the convention. It was accepted by the 
government, published on March 31st, 2017 and will enter into force from January 1st, 2019. 
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Tariff Band 
Before AJ 
Tariff Band 
After AJ 
Procedure Actual 
baseline 
Convention 
tariff (cap) 
National 
Average 
2021 baseline 
Convention 
tariff (cap) 
Regulated Regulated Primary tooth 
Extraction 
16,72 (16,72) 16,72 (16,72) 23,07 (23,07) 
Regulated 
 
Regulated 
 
3 surface 
Restoration 
 
40,97 (40,97) 40,97 (40,97) 67,33 (67,33) 
Regulated 
 
Regulated 
 
Molar Root 
Canal 
Treatment 
81,94 (81,94) 81,94 (81,94) 81,94 (81,94) 
Regulated 
 
Regulated 
 
Simple 
permanent 
tooth 
Extraction 
33,44 (33,44) 33,44 (33,44) 
 
33,44 (33,44) 
 
Reimbursed, 
Not regulated 
Regulated  3 surface Inlay-
Onlay 
40,97 (NC) 278 (NC) CAP : 295 
Reimbursed, 
Not regulated 
Regulated  
 
 
PFM Crown 122,5 (NC) 540* (NC) CAP : 547 
Reimbursed, 
Not regulated 
Regulated  
 
Full set of 
dentures 
365,50(NC) 2286 (NC) CAP : 1970 
Reimbursed, 
Not regulated 
Regulated  
 
 
Bridge (3 
element) 
279,50 (NC) 1199 (NC) CAP : 1070 
 
Table 2 :Non-exhaustive list of price changes in the French dental convention from the SNIIRAM 2015 
Extraction Prices are shown in Euros (€) ;   
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 2.3 Response of the dental profession 
 
On January 6th, following the CNSD and the FSDL’s withdrawal from the negotiations, a nation-wide strike 
was launched by the French National Association of Dental Students (UNECD)(13). This movement covers 
all 16 dental faculties and teaching hospitals in France. A first protest was organized on the January 27th, 
2017 by the UNECD and the FSDL. A second protest was organized before the publication of the Arbitrary 
Judgment on 3rd March. It was supported by 10,000 dental professionals(14). The strike endured for 2 
months, affecting 90% of dental students. The main complaints from the students were that preventive 
and conservative treatments were not being sufficiently funded by the NHI, and that a restorative based 
practice was being favored instead of comprehensive health outcomes focused payment system. 
 Trade Unions filed complaints to the Conseil d’Etat, the French supreme court for administrative justice, 
challenging the Arbitrary Judgement’s legal basis. All complaint procedures were dismissed (15).  
 
2.4. Presidential Campaign & re-opening of the negotiations  
 
These dental negotiations occurred in the context of the 2017 French Presidential elections. While the 
negotiations and the Arbitrary Judgment procedures were ongoing, several presidential candidates were 
particularly vocal on the topic and introduced principles for reform, should they be elected. 
Candidate Emmanuel Macron took a strong stand on two aspects of dentistry: to increase the coverage 
of preventive procedures; and to fully reimburse prosthodontic procedures for patients(16,17).  On May 
5th, 2017, Emmanuel Macron was elected president of France on 5th May 2017. He nominated Pr. Agnès 
Buzyn, a Professor of Hematology and former head of the High Authority of Health, as Minister of Health 
on May 17th(18). In the summer of 2017, Pr. Buzyn re-opened the negotiations with the trade unions. She 
also delayed the enforcement of the Arbitrary Judgment by one year. Negotiations started again in 
September 2017, a move welcomed by the dental profession. Understanding the background discussed 
in this paper for this second round of negotiations is essential to understand the context of the reform 
that will be enforced from 2019. Its final content will be discussed in a separate paper.  
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3. Discussion  
 
The Arbitrary Judgement broke the historic negotiating framework between the stakeholders. It sparked 
vivid reactions from the unions and led to the largest protests the profession had seen in decades. 
Although the unions are now generally satisfied with the opening of new negotiations, tensions are still 
likely to arise pending a number of possible future events.  
Firstly, should the negotiations fail, the Arbitrary Judgment is still scheduled to be enforced on January 
1st, 2019. This situation would effectively force the trade unions to accept any “negotiated” solution. 
Secondly, the government is committed to seeing through President Macron's promise of fully regulating 
certain types of dental prosthetic procedures to ensure patients are left with no OOP spending. The 
information systems for the French health insurance systems (SNIIRAM) are comprehensive, and contain 
data on all NHI claims. According to the SNIIRAM database (17) the cap on dental prosthesis procedures 
proposed by the previous government was roughly equal to the average fee charged by French dentists. 
(Table 2) In the 5-year budget for the next convention, additional funds of €800 million have been 
identified by the NHI to increase conservative and preventive treatments in the new negotiations, with 
the costs of this falling on the NHI and CHI’s. However, OOP payments for dental prosthesis procedures 
in France sum to €3 billion a year(19). Thus, the aforementioned reform is likely to lead to either a limited 
number of procedures eligible for full coverage, or will require procedural fees to be adjusted to well 
below the value of those currently charged by dentists, in order to keep the reform affordable for a Social 
Security. While the NHI signaled that dentists will likely keep semi-regulated fees on some top-tier 
procedures, the changes and limitations required by implementing the reform may spark reactions from 
the trade unions similar to those of 2017. 
 
The NHI has limited knowledge regarding the oral health status of the population: there are no accessible 
resources providing national results for epidemiological studies of the adult population. Some regional 
studies show that the prevalence of the need for dental care was as high as 35.0%(20),whilst the EU-SILC 
2013 indicators show that France was amongst the middle third performers in terms of unmet care needs 
for dental examination(21). The last national study for the prevalence of dental caries for children (DMFT 
12 years old) dates back to 2006(22). This data is now outdated, and the studies not comfortably viable 
for consideration as epidemiological studies have since evolved and criteria for evaluation have been 
updated. (23) 
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Due to this lack of available information, agreeing fees of reimbursement potentially opens the system up 
to large budget shortfalls or overspends, without considering the needs of the population. This approach 
to policy making is hugely risky, at a time when health systems are looking to best assess ways to 
implement cost-effective, health-outcomes focused prevention based payment systems(24). 
 
Despite 95% of the population receiving CHI coverage(25), significant differences of  funding  dental 
procedures  can be found among social groups depending on their employer-provided insurance. The ANI 
law mandating all private companies to provide employees with some complimentary insurance allowed 
access to a greater portion of the population, but many companies opted for less expensive contracts in 
order to keep costs to a minimum. Such "contracts" offer partial funding for partially regulated and 
unregulated procedures. Some employees needing extensive dental therapy are thus inclined to contract 
a second private insurance(26), at their own expense, resulting in significant financial burden. The CMUc 
scheme also creates tensions : Patients benefit from price ceilings imposed on some dental procedures 
which are only partially regulated for patients under the general scheme. For example, the average 
national fee charged for a set of complete removable dentures is €2286, but under the CMUc regimen the 
treatment cost is capped at €1312.This leads to a tendency for discrimination against CMUc patients : 
31.6% of practices refused to treat them in Paris in 2009.(27) 
 
Historically, priority has been given to operative care, at the expense of preventive dentistry. 
Interventions such as motivational interviewing,  fluoride varnishes and advanced caries management and 
control systems are not reimbursed by the NHI, despite the available evidence(28–30). Due to this focus 
on restorative treatment, funding decisions seem to be driven by the curative path dependence 
of French dental practices on the provider side, and by accounting principles to stay under a 
capped budget for the government. Whilst prevention is often advocated as a cost-saving approach by 
the dental trade unions, there is also lack of robust evidence on the cost-effectiveness of preventive 
treatments in France, making it hard for policymakers to make evidence-based decisions. 
The economic structure of the French dental sector is on the verge of profound change. It is a traditionally 
self-employed sector, with sole operator practices and limited supporting staff: there were on average 
0,4 employee per practicing dentist in France (31). Whilst the new generation of practitioners seem to be 
firmly committed to model of practitioner self-employment, they tend to develop larger practices with a 
wider skill mix, which may be more efficient(32). Drawing from current trends, it is fair to say that if current 
practitioners do not invest in cost-efficient, patient-centered practices, they may face stiff competition 
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from health care corporations. In recent years, CHI have expanded their bargaining power. They can 
propose binding contracts to practitioners that, in exchange of the promise of an additional inflow of 
patients, require smaller fees, sometimes leaving patients with small or non-existent OOP payments. 
Whilst such changes may drive welcome improvements in the efficiency of practices, under a payment 
system which provides financial incentives for restorative work rather than prevention, this may also lead 
to a decrease in the quality of preventive care, and ultimately have a negative impact on long-term patient 
health outcomes.(24) 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
 
The French Dental Negotiations of 2016 have sparked vivid reactions amongst the profession, which led 
to a national strike, accompanied by dental students blocking access to all dental hospitals in France. In 
an effort to ease the relations with the profession, the government has suspended the last imposed 
contract, to find a new compromise in which preventive care has been declared to be of capital 
importance. However, the lack of basic epidemiological data for the French population keeps 
policymakers from evaluating the outcomes of each dental contract reform and the necessary policy 
changes. In order to facilitate evidence-based discussions, centered on the needs of the patients, the oral 
health status of the French population urgently needs to be analyzed. This reform is of crucial relevance 
for policymakers in Europe that may try to improve the access to dental care by regulating dental fees. 
2019 will tell if the reform is likely to succeed, with lower fees for patients, or drive out a portion of 
Dentists out of the public system. A profound change of the Oral Health System in France is to be expected. 
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